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1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol in which a dealer distributes a secret among a set
of participants such that only specied subsets of them, dened by the access structure,
can recover the secret at a later time.
Cachin [1] proposed a computationally secure scheme for online secret sharing with
general access structures, where all the shares are as short as the secret. The scheme
provides the ability to share multiple secrets and allows participants to be added dynam-
ically, without having to redistribute new shares. These abilities are realised by storing
additional authentic information at a publicly accessible location.
Pinch [2] pointed out that Cachin's scheme does not allow shares to be reused after
the secret has been reconstructed without a further distributed evaluation protocol such
as Goldreich et al. [3]. Pinch presented a modied protocol for computationally secure
online seceret sharing, based on the intractability of the Die Hellman problem, where
shares can be re-used.
Ghodosi et al. [4] pointed out that Pinch's scheme is vulnerable to cheating. They
present a modied version of Pinch's protocol which detects cheating and prevents cheat-
ing assuming a majority of participants are honest, but does not protect a minority of
participants of an authorised set against a majority colluding to falsely accuse the minority
of cheating.
We propose an enhanced modied version of Pinch's secret sharing protocol which has
the advantages over the original scheme, and its modication by Ghodosi et al., that it
detects cheating and enables the identication of all cheaters by an arbitrator, regardless
of their number.
2 Pinch's Scheme
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol between a set of participants P = fP
1
; : : : ; P
n
g and
a dealer D, where D 62 P is assumed. Certain subsets X 2 2
P
are authorised to recover
the secret K, initially known only to D, by combining shares S
i
, each S
i
being known only
to P
i
and D. The access structure   is then the set of minimal authorised sets, where an
authorised set X is minimal if and only if Y  X and Y authorised implies that X = Y .
In the remainder of this paper we work within the ring of integers modulo p, for some
prime p. We suppose p  1 has a large prime factor q, and we choose an element g 2Z
p
of order q. The primes p and q must be chosen so that determining discrete logarithms
to the base g modulo p is computationally infeasible. Most of our calculations involve
working within the multiplicative cyclic group of order q generated by g. It is possible to
describe the schemes in a more general group-theoretic framework, although we do not
consider this here. We also use a one-way function f .
The basic protocol to share K 2Z
p
works as follows:
The dealer D, who knows the secret K, randomly chooses secret shares S
i
< q for each
participant P
i
and transmits S
i
over a secure channel to P
i
. For each minimal trusted
set X 2   the dealer D randomly chooses g
X
to be an element of multiplicative order q
(mod p), and computes
T
X
= K   f(g
Q
x2X
S
x
X
) mod p
and posts the pair (g
X
; T
X
) on the notice board.
To recover the secret K, a minimal trusted set X = fP
1
; : : : ; P
t
g of participants comes
together and performs the following steps:
1. Participant P
1
reads g
X
from the notice board and sends g
X
S
1
mod p to P
2
.
2. Each subsequent participant P
i
, for 1 < i < t, receives g
X
S
1
S
2
:::S
i 1
mod p, raises it
to the power S
i
and sends the result, which equals g
X
S
1
S
2
:::S
i
mod p, to P
i+1
.
3. The nal participant P
t
receives g
X
S
1
S
2
S
t 1
mod p and raises this value to the
power S
t
to form
V
X
= g
X
S
1
S
2
S
t
mod p = g
Q
x2X
S
x
X
mod p:
4. On behalf of group X , member P
t
reads T
X
from the notice board and can now
reconstruct K as K = T
X
+ f(V
X
) mod p.
If there are multiple secrets K
i
to share, then it is possible to use the same shares S
i
and
one way function f , provided that each entry on the notice board has a fresh value g
X
attached.
3 Analysis of the Protocol
3.1 How to detect cheating
Ghodosi et al. [4] describe a method for detecting cheating in the above protocols. Sup-
pose in the initialisation phase of the scheme, the dealer D sends g
X
V
X
mod p to every
authorised set X . Let the reconstruction protocol be the same as in the above scheme
and let V
0
X
be the computed result. Every participant x 2 X can verify that g
X
V
0
X
 g
X
V
X
(mod p). If the verication fails, then cheating has occurred in the protocol and thus the
computed secret is not correct.
However, this method should be carefully implemented to prevent attacks which exploit
the arithmetic of exponents. Since we choose our generator g
X
to have order q, we know
that g
X
V
0
X
 g
X
V
X
(mod p) if and only if V
0
X
 V
X
(mod q). Hence, if a malicious
participant could arrange for everyone to accept V
0
X
= V
X
+ rq for some non-zero integer
r, then cheating will not be detected.
For this reason, we propose an alternative way of detecting cheating. Suppose in
the initialisation phase of the scheme, the dealer D publishes h(K
i
) on the notice board
for every secret K
i
that is being shared (where h is a one-way collision-resistance hash-
function). Every participant, having reconstructed the secret (K
0
i
, say), can verify its
validity by hashing it and comparing the resulting hash-code h(K
0
i
) with the value on the
notice board. If the verication fails, then cheating has occurred in the protocol and thus
the computed secret is not correct.
Note that the second method requires less storage space on the notice board than the
rst method. In the rst method D stores g
X
V
X
mod p on the notice board, and hence
needs to store j j values for every secret. In the second method, D stores h(K
i
) on the
notice board, and hence D only needs to store one hash-code for every secret. Thus, the
second method is a better way of detecting cheating.
3.2 An Enhanced Protocol which identies all cheaters
We now describe an enhanced version of the protocol, which will enable the identication
(by the dealer) of all cheaters. As a pre-requisite to using the scheme, every partici-
pant must have an implementation of an agreed digital signature scheme, and must have
selected a key pair for this signature scheme.
In addition, every participant must have a means of obtaining a veried copy of every
other participant's public signature verication key. This could, for example, be provided
by having a Trusted Third Party (e.g. the dealer, D) certify every participant's public
key, and having every participant distribute their certicate with every signed message
they send.
The modied protocol will operate exactly as described in section 2, with the exception
of the following modications. In Steps 1 and 2 of the protocol, participant P
i
, as well as
forwarding g
X
S
1
S
2
S
i
mod p, also forwards a signature on a data string, signed using his
or her private signature key. More specically, if s
P
i
(Y ) denotes the digital signature on
data Y computed using the private signature key of P
i
, then P
i
computes and forwards
the signature
s
P
i
(g
X
S
1
S
2
S
i
mod pjjX jjg
X
)
to the next participant P
i+1
(where jj denotes concatenation of data items). Also, when
participant P
i
receives g
X
S
1
S
2
:::S
i 1
mod p and the signed string containing g
X
S
1
S
2
:::S
i 1
mod
p, P
i
checks the signature before proceeding with the protocol.
If cheating is detected by the method described in the second scheme in section 3.1,
then every participant sends to the dealer the signed data strings they received during
execution of the protocol. The dealer D calculates g
S
1
X
; g
S
1
S
2
X
; : : : ; g
S
1
S
t
X
in sequence,
checking that whatD gets is what was submitted by P
1
; P
2
; : : : ; P
t
. As soon as a calculated
value g
S
1
S
i
X
does not equal the submitted value, D knows that P
i
cheated. P
i
cannot
claim to have been framed, since D has P
i
's signature on s
P
i
(g
X
S
1
S
2
S
i
mod pjjX jjg
X
).
Then D uses the cheater's submission to check P
i+1
's submission and so on (i.e. for every
i, D veries that the value signed by P
i
raised to the power S
i+1
mod p is equal to the
value signed by P
i+1
). Thus, D will then be able to identify all the parties who sent
incorrect values during the protocol.
This use of signatures will also protect a minority of the members of an authorised set
against a majority colluding to falsely accuse the minority of cheating.
4 Conclusion
The enhanced protocol can be used in such a way that cheating by participants can be
detected, in which case the participants in an authorised set X can request help from the
dealer D, who can always uniquely identify the cheaters.
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